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Abstract. The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a significant toll on people across the world 
and leaders have had to tackle unforeseen challenges. From the time the outbreak was first 
identified in December 2019 to the time of publication, more than 24 million cases of 
coronavirus had been reported globally, resulting in more than 824,000 deaths. Many 
countries have taken various measures to combat the virus, but the wildly different 
responses and response timelines around the world resulted either in failures or successes, 
leaving people questioning which strategy works best. In this paper, the author examines 
the accounts of government failure in coronavirus responses in China, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and the United States that contributed to the outbreak reaching 
unprecedented extremes. These government failures are contrasted with Sweden’s 
successful laissez-faire approach which serves as a crisis response model. In sum, in the 
attempt to combat the COVID-19 outbreak, governments expanded and squeezed out 
individual freedoms and liberties which will ultimately have lasting consequences in the 
post-pandemic world.. 
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1. Introduction  
ational governments pride themselves on creating the next-best 
program intended to dramatically alter and improve the lives of its 
citizens. More often than not, the results of their efforts are quite 
the opposite. Through an analysis of government intervention overtime, 
many of government programs are utter failures and inflict more damage 
than assistance. The theory of government failure states that ‚the 
production and distribution of a commodity through a competitive market 
in which all the relevant agents are pursuing their own self-interest will 
result in an allocation of that commodity that is socially inefficient‛ (Le 
Grand, 1991). When government failure is present, Adam Smith’s ‚invisible 
hand‛ is void and competitive markets will work inefficiently. Through the 
greater presence of government, inefficiency invites corruption which, in 
turn, inhibits individual rights and freedoms. During a crisis, however, 
governments find the need to spend more money and increase regulation, 
all subject to waste, fraud, and abuse. Through increased regulation, 
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politicians take advantage and us crises as perfect opportunities to succeed 
in their own bureaucratic or political agendas, satisfying their own self-
interest. In the meantime, citizens find themselves adhering to their state’s 
agenda and are unable to exert their individual liberties. The consequences 
of government failure are widespread from economic damage to reducing 
personal freedoms and individual liberties.     
In order to properly analyze the shortcomings of enhanced government 
presence in daily life, the question: what causes government failure in the 
first place, must be asked. In ‚Why the Federal Government Fails,‛ Chris 
Edwards succinctly highlights 5 causes for all government failures: 
1. Federal policies rely on top-down planning and coercion: Federal 
policies are then based on guesswork because there is no price system to 
guide decision making. Additionally, failed policies are not weeded out 
because they are funded by taxes, which are not contingent on performance; 
2. The government lacks knowledge about society’s complex structure; 
3.  Legislators often act counter to the general public interest; 
4. Civil servants act within a bureaucratic system that rewards inertia, 
not the creation of value; 
5. The federal government has grown enormous in size and scope. 
Failure has increased as legislators have become overloaded by the vast 
array of programs they have created (Edwards, 2015). 
Along with greater government involvement come failed programs and 
lackluster initiatives, that while attempting to help citizens, only plague the 
real needs of society. Through failed government programs, freedom and 
prosperity are crushed.  
Throughout history, various scholars have analyzed the causes of 
government failure and all reverted back to the same conclusion: 
government intervention causes more harm than good. Although the world 
may not be immune to government failures, government intervention 
makes situations worse. In 1912, welfare economist Arthur Cecil (A.C.) 
Pigouw rote in Wealth and Welfare: 
‚It is not sufficient to contrast the imperfect adjustments of unfettered 
private enterprise with the best adjustments that economists in their 
studies can imagine. For we cannot expect that any State authority 
will attain, or even whole-heartedly seek, that ideal. Such authorities 
are liable alike to ignorance, to sectional pressure, and to personal 
corruption by private interest‛ (Pigou, 1912). 
Moreover, societies should not rely on government to swoop in and act 
as their savior. Although the government might think it knows what is best 
for its citizens, the government has no true way of knowing what is best for 
each individual. Often, a politician’s corrupt private interests will more 
often than not drive government action. 
Along the same lines, in 1932, James Beck, a member of Congress and 
former U.S. solicitor general, shed a light on the reality of government 
programs and wasteful spending in Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy. He said 
that the Federal Farm Board, which spent $500 million on programs, was 
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an incredible failure. He believed that subsidies for farmers, shipping 
companies, and sugar companies made no sense. Federal ‚efforts to run 
businesses during and after World War I were ‘costly failures’ of 
‘extraordinary ineptitude’‛ (Edwards, 2015). The problem with government 
according to Beck was ‚that the ‘remedy may often be worse than the 
disease’‛ (Beck, 1933). Government intervention will not solve society’s 
problems and when it steps in, worsens the state. In 1944, Friedrich Hayek, 
a classic liberal economist, commented on the failure of government 
planning in an economy. He warned in his most famous book, The Road to 
Serfdom, of the ‚danger of tyranny that inevitably results from government 
control of economic decision-making through central planning‛ (Ebeling, 
1999). On personal freedom, Hayek emphasizes the importance of 
specialized knowledge that governments could never come close to 
understanding. Each individual comes to possess local knowledge in ‚his 
corner of the division of labor that he alone may fully understand and 
appreciate how to use‛ (Ebeling, 1999). With a free market system, 
individual preferences and local conditions will be maximized. 
Government planning cannot access such valuable knowledge and since it 
is impossible to know all of the information required to guide society, the 
government will never be able to satisfy the needs of individuals through 
centralized programming. 
As noted by Hayek, a key cause of government failure is the lack of 
knowledge of an individual’s personal preferences and choices. In an ideal 
world, the government would place an emphasis on preserving individual 
liberties and freedoms rather than squeezing them out. Milton Friedman, 
an American free-market economist, argued that a ‚key problem was that 
government policies destroy individual choice‛ (Edwards, 2015). 
Government forces people to act according to a common good or general 
interest rather than their own. Through central planning, governments 
expect citizens to act on their social responsibility to serve the interest of the 
greater good, but this inevitably leads to waste and fraud. According to 
Friedman, the individual, by pursuing his own interest, will ‚frequently 
promote that of society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to 
trade for the public good‛ (Friedman, 1962). Markets must promote 
diversity and the exploitation of each individual’s potential, but 
government control requires uniformity, and, through uniformity, 
individuals cannot prosper. A citizen should be given the choice to control 
their success and not act according to what the government thinks is best. 
Furthermore, most known for his work on public choice theory, American 
economist James Buchanan comments on the government’s structural 
failures that undermine public choice. Public choice theory suggests that 
the very presence of government likely produces government failure. 
Buchanan asks that ‚we tackle the essential task of political economy via a 
social contract, by which he means a constitution that simultaneously 
legitimizes and limits the activities of government‛ (Christainsen, 1988).  
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Although the previous analysis has its roots in right-leaning classical 
liberal literature, government failure has more recently been examined by 
those who identify closer to the center of the political spectrum. In a 2006 
Brookings Institution study, Clifford Winston discusses the disappointing 
result of the United States government’s microeconomic policies. He 
examines government policies that were intended to correct market failures 
but instead had major flaws. First, he found that government policy created 
‚economic inefficiencies where significant market failures do not appear to 
exist‛ (Winston, 2006), but these failures were not confirmed by empirical 
evidence. Second, where market failures do exist, ‚government policy has 
either achieved expensive successes by correcting these failures in a way 
that sacrifices substantial net benefits or in some cases has actually reduced 
social welfare‛ (Winston, 2006). These government failures ‚cost the U.S. 
economy hundreds of billions of dollars a year‛ (Winston, 2006). 
Government intervention wastes precious time and resources. Similarly, in 
his book Why Government Fails So Often – and How It Can Do Better, Peter 
Shuck examines why so many domestic policies fail in the United States. 
The core proposal in his book states that ‚federal domestic policy failures 
are caused by deep, recurrent, and endemic structural conditions‛ (Shuck, 
2014). Government failures grow out of a ‚‘deeply entrenched policy 
process, a political culture, a perverse official incentive system, individual 
and collective irrationality, inadequate information, rigidity inertia, lack of 
credibility, mismanagement, market dynamics, the inherent limits of law, 
implementation problems, and a weak bureaucratic system’‛ (Edwards, 
2015). Since then, we have seen the same cyclical nature of these 
government failures occur time and time again. Although the notion of 
government failure will be contested for many years to come, individuals 
with different political identifications must agree on the nature of a failure: 
‚If a federal program is not achieving what policymakers promised, it is a 
failure. If a program is generating high levels of fraud or corruption, it is a 
failure. If the costs of a program are clearly higher than the benefits it is a 
failure‛ (Edwards, 2015). In many instances of centralized programming, 
individuals are faced with government failure.  
Today, with the COVID-19 pandemic, federal programs intended to 
fight the virus in certain countries were the epitome of government failure. 
Countries with small government presences such as Singapore, Taiwan, 
and South Korea were able to act swiftly and efficiently. These countries 
were able to get the virus under control from the very start without wasting 
precious time and resources. Other countries, however, did not follow the 
small government model and thought enhanced government planning and 
programming would do the trick. These governments and their 
bureaucratic leaders thought they knew what was best for the health and 
safety of its citizens. This was not the case. Italian philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben speaks along these lines and is best known for his ideas on the 
‚state of exception.‛ This theory nicely applies to the current crisis. 
Agamben states that the media and authorities have done their best to 
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spread a state of panic, thus justifying serious limitations on movement and 
a suspension of daily life in entire regions. This plays into a vicious circle in 
which ‚the limitations of freedom imposed by governments are accepted in 
the name of a desire for safety that was created by the same governments 
that are now intervening to satisfy it‛ (Agamben, 2020). The governments 
in question continuously found grounds throughout the crisis to curtail the 
freedom of its citizens and thus, failed to the highest extent. 
Through the analysis of the responses of four specific countries, this 
paper attempts to prove how countries with high levels of government 
intervention failed to keep the virus under control and cost its nation lives, 
time, and money. Government failure will be documented and analyzed in 
countries that were/are the epicenters of the coronavirus: China, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The failure of combatting the 
coronavirus crisis in these four countries is rooted in failures to act quickly 
at the start of the outbreak, rampant corruption, and complex bureaucracies 
halting efficient responses. The failed responses will be contrasted by 
analyzing Sweden’s laissez-faire, no-lockdown approach which, at the time 
of writing,has  brought wide success to country and its people. By 
protecting individual liberties, Sweden has been successful in ‚flattening 
the curve,‛ according to relevant statistics. In turn, the presence of big 
government in the coronavirus responses of these four countries crushed 
individual freedoms. In the future, policy measures, in order to be effective, 
must have well-defined objectives and act on those goals accordingly.  
 
2. China 
The Chinese government knew that COVID-19 appeared in late 2019 but 
they actively worked to keep the virus a secret from their population and 
the world. The first human cases of COVID-19 were first reported in 
December 2019 by officials in the city of Wuhan, China. On January 7, 2020, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) announced they had identified the 
new virus named 2019-nCoV. On January 11th, China announced its first 
death from the virus, a 61-year-old man who had purchased products from 
a seafood market (China Reports First Death, 2020). On January 17th, a 
second death was reported in Wuhan and on January 20, China reported a 
third death and more than 200 infections, with cases spreading outside the 
Hubei province including Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. The same day, 
Zhong Nanshan, head of the National Health Commission and a prominent 
Chinese infectious disease expert, confirmed human-to-human 
transmission in an interview with China’s CCTV state broadcaster (China 
Confirms Human-to-Human Transmission, 2020). This raised fears of a 
major outbreak as millions travelled for the Lunar New Year holiday at the 
end of January. At this point, the WHO said that the outbreak did not 
‚constitute a public emergency of international concern and there was ‘no 
evidence’ of the virus spreading between humans outside of China‛ 
(Timeline: How the new coronavirus spread, 2020). That was the beginning 
of the WHO’s cover-up for China of the global health emergency. Even 
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though the WHO declared the coronavirus a global emergency on January 
30th, it was not declared a pandemic until March 11, 2020. In the early 
stages of the virus, the Chinese government downplayed the extremity of 
the outbreak and made it seem as ifthey had everything under control 
when in reality, they did not. To preserve its bureaucratic interests, the 
WHO sided with China in preserving the realities of the coronavirus 
outbreak in its country. This would in turn caused a virus that could have 
been monitored and controlled into a devastating outbreak that crippled 
the rest of the world.   
First and foremost, China was ill-equipped to combat the virus. Since it 
was heavily affected by the 2002 SARS epidemic, China created a high-
quality denominated infectious disease reporting system. This system 
would allow hospitals to input patients’ details into a computer and 
instantly notify government health authorities in Beijing. However, this 
system created by the Chinese government failed. When the first patients 
were hit with the novel coronavirus in December 2019, the reporting was 
supposed to have been automatic. Rather, hospitals withheld information 
about cases from the national reporting system due to political aversion to 
sharing bad news, ‚keeping Beijing in the dark and delaying the response‛ 
(Myers, 2020). The central health authorities learned about the outbreak 
‚not from the reporting system but after unknown whistleblowers leaked 
two internal documents online‛ (Myers, 2020). The failure of this 
government program was the beginning of China’s shortcomings in 
controlling the outbreak. 
Second, the outbreak in China worsened due to the lack of government 
transparency and communication of the extremity of the virus to its 
citizens. To no surprise, the Chinese government cracked down on freedom 
of speech in order make it seem like they were containing the virus. In the 
beginning of February, China embarked on a mission of censorship and 
suppression that went above and beyond of the Chinese Communist 
Party’s routine practices. News coming out of Wuhan praised the Chinese 
government’s strong grip on the outbreak. However, as citizens shared 
accounts of the havoc the virus was wreaking on their communities on 
social media, and as reporters wrote and published truthful stories about 
the outbreak, China’s censors diligently deleted these posts and stories. 
Through this method, China was able to conceal the extent of the outbreak 
and inadequacy of its response. Through high-intensity censorship, the 
country could portray itself as a ‚benevolent savior to its people and a 
generous friend supplying medical equipment to the world‛ (Stevens, 
2020). By May 2020, China voiced the narrative that its unprecedented 
quarantine measures gave the world a head start and instead blamed other 
countries for not seizing the opportunity and time China justly offered 
them.  
Although China took extreme measures to maintain its domestic 
outbreak, it also took extraordinary steps to cleverly collect information 
and curate it to its own needs. According to Shawn Yuan, a Beijing-based 
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journalist, two main kinds of content were sought after for deletion: 
‚journalistic investigations of how the epidemic first started was kept 
under wraps in late 2019 and live accounts of the mayhem and suffering 
inside Wuhan in the early days of the city’s lockdown, as its medical 
system buckled under the world’s first hammer strike of patients‛ (Yuan, 
2020). This information war became the center of an intense geopolitical 
debate where, due to various vanished accounts of the virus, the regime’s 
cover up of the initial outbreak in its country ‚certainly did not help buy 
the world time, but instead apparently incubated what some have 
described as a humanitarian disaster in Wuhan and Hubei Province, which 
in turn may have set the stage for the global spread of the virus‛ (Yuan, 
2020). The state deprived citizens of vital information when they needed it 
most. Yet again, another instance of extreme government failure. 
The most notable account of Chinese censor ship is when the Chinese 
government took down an article written by Caixin, a prominent Chinese 
news outlet. On February 26th, Caixin published an article entitled ‚Tracing 
the Gene Sequencing of the Novel Coronavirus: When was the Alarm 
Sounded?‛ which offered a detailed timeline of the outbreak. According to 
the report, the provincial health commission began ‚actively suppressing 
scientists’ knowledge about the virus as early as January 1‛ (Yuan, 2020). 
According to Caixin, a gene sequencing lab in Guangzhou discovered in 
January that the virus that appeared in Wuhan shared high degrees of 
similarities with the virus that caused the SARS outbreak in 2003. 
According to an anonymous source, ‚Hubei’s health commission promptly 
demanded that the lab suspend all testing and destroy all samples‛ (Yuan, 
2020). This information, however, could not reach the public quickly as it 
was taken down from the Chinese internet only hours after it was 
published. When asked to comment on Caixin’s investigation, China’s CDC 
responded, ‚’We have made sure to respond to the COVID-19 outbreak as 
efficiently as possible and do not condone news reports that accused our 
center of mishandling the crisis’‛ (Yuan, 2020).  
News outlets were not the only subjects getting shutdown; Wuhan’s 
frontline health workers were also censored inside hospitals. On February 
5, 2020, a Chinese magazine entitled China Newsweek interviewed a doctor 
in Wuhan who confirmed that physicians were told by heads of hospitals 
not to share any information in the beginning of the outbreak. Many other 
doctors supported this narrative. Doctors were not allowed to wear 
isolation gowns because it might stoke fears within the hospitals. They 
were obeying the rules but were extremely confused as to why they could 
not say anything or notify their patients as they had the right to know for 
their health and safety. The cyclical trend of publishing detailed timelines 
of the outbreak and accounts of personal stories just to have them purged 
and deleted continued on. The real war on information between the 
Chinese government and its social media users began on February 7th after 
the death of Dr. Li Wenliang.  
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A doctor named Li Wenliang, a whistleblower who had raised a red flag 
about the coronavirus back in December 2019, and who was reprimanded 
on the basis of making false comments, died of coronavirus on February 6, 
2020. The news of Dr. Li’s death became the top trending topic on Chinese 
social media and brought with it demands for action. Citizens demanded 
that the Wuhan government offer Dr. Li an apology and ‚We Want 
Freedom of Speech‛ was among the trending hashtags in the nation. 
Naturally, the hashtags were later censored. This story is just one piece of 
evidence in blaming the CCP for the delayed public recognition of the 
virus. The government’s treatment of Dr. Li contended that the lack of free 
speech in China facilitated the spread of the virus. The Chinese government 
attempted to take on the role as the savior and constructed its image to be 
savior-like to its citizens: they had it all under control and there was 
nothing for their country to worry about. The Chinese government was 
more worried about the image that would be presented to the rest of the 
world rather than telling the truth and putting the health and safety of its 
citizens first. 
A report by Francesca Ghiretti, an Asian studies researcher at Istituto 
Affari Internazionali concludes that the coronavirus crisis reignited debates 
on the lack of freedom of speech in China. The crux of the report is that the 
outbreak ‚could have been better contained if it were not for Chinese 
restrictions on freedom of expression‛ (Ghiretti, 2020). If there was a higher 
flow of information, people would have known about the risks early on, 
and with reliable and updated information, could have planned 
accordingly. Some international voices praised China for its ability to 
implement such large-scale containment measures, but it is important to 
note that China’s authoritarian nature was a feature that allowed the virus 
to spread uncontrollably around the world. A growing number of voices 
have argued that such a drastic reaction by Chinese authorities was 
‚nothing more than an attempt to overcompensate for the initially slow 
response to the crisis‛ (Ghiretti, 2020).  
Additionally, China’s slow and complex bureaucratic processes played a 
crucial role in the rapid spread of the virus. The country’s disease control 
and prevention system proved too weak to be effective against the 
coronavirus crisis. Since SARS, ‚China’s spending on health has grown 10 
times, with thousands of local centers for disease control and prevention 
established across the country‛ (Leng, 2020). Unstable annual funding 
coupled with complicated bureaucracy worsened China’s preparedness to 
combat the coronavirus. The Chinese Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (China CDC) was founded after World War II and was 
criticized for its lagged warning of SARS. The China CDC did not issue 
recommendations on how to contain SARS until April 2003, five months 
after the earliest case was identified. The same problems were repeated 
now in 2020, but in both cases, the China CDC did not have authority to 
issue warnings. China’s CDC does not operate independently from state 
agencies as it obtains orders and funding from the National Health 
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Commission, an executive level department. According to Xi Chen, an 
assistant professor at the Yale School of Public Health, ‚’The China CDC is 
a research institution. They only issue reports to assist the National Health 
Commission to work on outbreaks, but they have no power to announce 
emergencies or take action against those who are spreading the virus. They 
have no power to mobilize medical supplies or staff members to other areas 
in China‛ (Leng, 2020). Therefore, China’s complex bureaucracy and 
entanglements within the organization of its bureaucracy organization lead 
to an exceedingly inefficient response to the coronavirus.  
Due to the dominant presence of big government in China, trends of 
disappearing freedom are apparent. If online campaigns are being heavily 
censored and journalists continue to be undermined, freedom of expression 
in China is now worse off than it was before the COVID-19 crisis. The 
Chinese Communist Party, with this outbreak, will continue to offer the 
world more socialism, squeezing out private enterprising and presenting 
the world with less prosperity and poorer health. This is the trend with 
every crisis: as the size of government and the power of its repression 
grow, freedom is diminished. Although the Chinese government wanted to 
promote the narrative that the State saved its citizens and the world from 
the crisis, the truth is, in fact, quite the contrary. Government failure failed 
to mitigate the crisis and possibly even worsened the pandemic for the rest 
of the world.  
 
3. United Kingdom 
Since the first coronavirus case was confirmed in the U.K., the 
government struggled to get on top of the virus. The Global Health 
Security Index ranks the United Kingdom 2nd out of 195 countries overall 
for pandemic preparedness, classifying it as one of the most prepared 
countries in the world to tackle an outbreak (GHS, 2019). However, the 
actions taken by the U.K.’s government speaks otherwise. Its lack of early 
preparation, failure to provide adequate protective equipment, and ill-
equipped health service are just a few reasons why big government failed 
to maintain the outbreak and worsened the coronavirus crisisfor the U.K. 
and the world.  
The U.K. was tremendously unprepared for the coronavirus pandemic. 
In 2016, the U.K. ran a simulation exercise codenamed ‚Cygnus‛ involving 
950 officials from central and local government, NHS organizations, 
prisons and local emergency response planners. The simulation found that 
the country would face a massive shortage of ventilators and personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for health workers if a pandemic struck. The 
U.K.’s preparedness and response, in terms of its ‚plans, policies and 
capability, [was] currently not sufficient to cope with the extreme demands 
of a severe pandemic that will have a nationwide impact across all sectors‛ 
(Pegg, 2020). Although the country should have immediately addressed 
these shortcomings that resulted from the simulation exercise, the planning 
was ‚put on hold for two years while contingency planning was diverted 
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to deal with a possible no-deal Brexit‛ (Yamey et al., 2020). This failure to 
address the massive hole in England’s health system hindered its ability to 
quickly and effectively combat the coronavirus crisis in 2020.  
From the beginning, the U.K. failed to recognize the risk the virus would 
pose to its nation. On April 13th, Dr. Jenny Harries, England’s Deputy Chief 
Medical Officer, argued that track-and-trace was not needed, saying that 
the WHO is ‚addressing all countries across the world, with entirely 
different health infrastructures‛ (Yamey et al., 2020). It is true that all 
countries have different health infrastructures, but that does not mean the 
disease is going to respond differently in a certain country or other. The 
coronavirus came about in a moment of frigid relationships between the 
government and scientists in England. The Johnson Administration 
claimed that all of its decisions were backed by science, but its Scientific 
Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) was initially masked in secrecy, 
with hidden memberships and closed meetings. Former Chief Scientific 
Adviser to the U.K. government from 2000-2007, David King, told the New 
York Times that he did not know if the Johnson government was following 
science since there was no ‚’freedom for the scientists to tell the public 
what their advice is’‛ (Landler et al., 2020). Rather than learning from 
science-based success programs in the world such as Singapore or South 
Korea, the U.K. pursued a herd-immunity strategy, leading to a massive 
death toll. In the U.K., healthcare workers were sent into hospitals and 
other facilities without proper PPE or access to testing. Nurses were forced 
in some cases to ‚use trash bags to protect their bodies and bandanas 
instead of proper N95 masks‛ (Yamey et al., 2020). On top of this 
mismanagement and malpractice, the U.K. failed to recognize the 
importance of its frontline workers. In June, reports surfaced that trainee 
nurses in the U.K. who were moved to the frontline in March to complete 
their training will ‚no longer be paid after July 31st‛ (Launder, 2020). 
 In addition to failing to address the risk of the virus, the U.K.’s 
nationalized health system, the Nationalized Health Service (NHS), was 
remarkably ill-equipped for the coronavirus crisis. Ultimately, the NHS has 
reached the point where it can no longer function. In March, 2020, an NHS 
health worker wrote that ‚when this is all over, the NHS England board 
should resign in their entirety‛ (Horton, 2020). The UK failed to test and 
contract trace and chose the ‚Contain-Delay-Mitigate-Research‛ strategy 
(Horton, 2020). This plan was adopted far too late in the course of events, 
leaving the NHS unprepared for the surge of critically ill patients. Richard 
Horton, Editor-in-Chief of the Lancet, asked NHS workers to contact him 
with their experiences and their messages were extremely disturbing:  
‚’It’s terrifying for staff at the moment. Still no access to personal 
protective equipment *PPE+ or testing.’ ‘Rigid command structures 
make decision making impossible.’ ‘There’s been no guidelines, it’s 
chaos.’ ‘I don’t feel safe. I don’t feel protected.’ ‘We are literally 
making it up as we go along.’ ‘It feels as if we are actively harming 
patients.’ ‘We need protection and prevention.’ ‘Total carnage.’ ‘NHS 
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Trusts continue to fail miserably.’ ‘Humanitarian crisis.’ ‘Forget 
lockdown—we are going into meltdown.’ ‘When I was country 
director in many conflict zones, we had better preparedness.’ ‘The 
hospitals in London are overwhelmed.’ ‘The public and media are not 
aware that today we no longer live in a city with a properly 
functioning western health-care system.’ ‘How will we protect our 
patients and staff...I am speechless. It is utterly unconscionable. How 
can we do this? It is criminal...NHS England was not prepared... We 
feel completely helpless’’ (Horton, 2020). 
The NHS was unprepared for this pandemic and they have a duty to 
make citizens aware. The month of February should have been used to 
‚expand testing capacity, ensure the distribution of PPE, and establish 
training programs and guidelines to protect NHS staff‛ (Horton, 2020). But, 
in actuality, the results were chaos and panic and an embarrassment of the 
Nationalized Health Service. Due to the nation’s failure to recognize the 
extent of the virus, a complex bureaucratic structure between different 
government sectors, and a failing nationalized health system, the 
coronavirus took a unnecessarily massive toll on the United Kingdom. 
 
4. Italy 
Italy was one of the hardest hit countries at the onset of the pandemic, 
making the coronavirus disaster one of Italy’s biggest crisis since World 
War II. Italy struggled to keep up with the spread of the virus. Now, 
policymakers all over the world are repeating the errors made early on in 
Italy, where, due to government failures, the pandemic turned into a 
catastrophe. From February 21st to March 22nd, Italy went from the 
‚discovery of the first official COVID-19 case to a government decree that 
essentially prohibited all movements of people within the whole territory, 
and the closure of all non-essential business activities‛ (Pisano et al., 2020). 
Italian leaders were unable to maintain the outbreak due to the failure to 
recognize the magnitude of the threat posed by the virus, to organize an 
early and swift response, and to learn from past successes and failures of 
those who came before. 
First, Italian politicians underestimated the effect the virus would have 
on its nation. In January, citizens called for severe measures to quarantine 
every single passenger arriving from China, but those were not considered 
by leadership. In late February, a few notable Italian politicians engaged in 
public handshaking in Milan to symbolize that there was no need to panic 
and life should go as planned. A week later, Nicola Zingaretti, leader of 
Italy’s Democratic party, one of the national ruling parties, who was at this 
event, tested positive for coronavirus. He made a statement on Facebook 
shortly after announcing that he had tested positive for the virus: ‚’I have 
always said ‘don’t panic’ and that we will fight this’‛ (Giuffrida, 2020). At 
this point, positive affirmations were the only virus-combatting tool 
dispersed to its citizens by Italian politicians.  
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From the beginning, Italy did not have a clear systemic approach and 
instead followed partial solutions to defeat the coronavirus. The Italian 
government dealt with the pandemic by issuing a series of decrees within 
lockdown areas which ultimately expanded until they applied to the entire 
country. Normally, this would be prudent, but, in this situation, according 
to Gary Pisano et. al, it backfired for two reasons. First, it was ‚inconsistent 
with the rapid exponential spread of the virus‛ (Pisano et al., 2020). The 
facts that were distributed on the ground did not help with predicting the 
situation a day later. Italy ‚followed the spread of the virus rather than 
prevented it‛ (Pisano et al., 2020). Second, the approach taken to only shut 
down certain areas might have catalyzed the spread of the virus, rather 
than stop it. If some regions went into lockdown, people then flocked to the 
south of Italy, spreading the virus to those regions that might have been 
not as hard hit at that time. The takeaway from this failed reaction is that 
‚an effective response to the virus needs to be orchestrated as a coherent 
system of actions taken simultaneously‛ (Pisano et al., 2020). Testing is only 
effective if it is coupled with strict contact tracing, and contact tracing 
works most efficiently if it is combined with an effective communication 
system that collates and spreads information of the movements of people. 
Given Italy’s lack of organization within the high levels of its government, 
this efficient response could not be achieved.  
Second, Italy did not follow the valuable lessons that could have been 
replicated from South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, which were able to 
contain the virus early. Since the Italian health care system is decentralized 
and left to the control of regional leaders, each region implemented 
different policy responses. The most notable difference in policy responses 
was the approach taken by Lombardy versus the approach taken by 
Veneto, two neighboring regions with similar socioeconomic profiles. 
Lombardy, one of Europe’s wealthiest and most productive areas, was 
disproportionately hit by the virus. Veneto, on the other hand, fared 
significantly better and now symbolizes Italy’s regional coronavirus 
success story. The trajectories of the regions have been shaped by a variety 
of factors, but it is becoming clearer that ‚different public health choices 
made early in the cycle of the pandemic also had an impact‛ (Pisano et al., 
2020). Lombardy and Veneto applied similar approaches to social 
distancing protocols and business closures, but Veneto took a much more 
proactive approach towards the containment of the virus. Veneto’s strategy 
was multi-faceted and was closest to that of the success stories in Singapore 
and Taiwan: 
 Extensive testing of symptomatic and asymptomatic cases early on; 
 Proactive tracing of potential positives. If someone tested positive, 
everyone in that patient’s home as well as their neighbors were tested. If 
testing kits were unavailable, they were self-quarantined; 
 A strong emphasis on home diagnosis and care. Whenever possible, 
samples were collected directly from a patient’s home and then processed 
in regional and local university labs; 
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 Specific efforts to monitor and protect health care and other 
essential workers. This included medical professionals, those in contact 
with at-risk populations (e.g., caregivers in nursing homes), and workers 
exposed to the public (e.g., supermarket cashiers, pharmacists, and 
protective services staff). (Pisano et al., 2020). 
The policies enacted in the Veneto region helped reduce the burden on 
hospitals and minimize the risk of COVID-19 spreading in medical facilities 
which was a drastic problem in hospitals in Lombardy. Lombardy, on the 
other hand, opted for a more laid-back approach to testing. On a per capita 
basis, Lombardy ‚conducted half of the tests conducted in Veneto and had 
a much stronger focus only on symptomatic cases – and has so far made 
limited investments in proactive tracing, home care and monitoring, and 
protection of health care workers‛ (Pisano et al., 2020). Although these 
regions are very similar, taking early, efficient approaches to combating the 
virus helped massively in maintaining the spread in Veneto. Not following 
this swift approach lead Lombardy down a death spiral. 
In addition to Italy’s lagged response time to the virus, the Italian 
nationalized healthcare system, to begin with, was in no shape to handle a 
crisis of this magnitude. Universal coverage is provided through Italy’s 
National Health Service (Serviziosanitarionazionale, or SSN) and since 
February 21st, when the first case of COVID-19 was recorded in the country, 
the SSN faced increasing pressures. In the most affected regions, the SSN 
‚is close to collapse‛ (Armocida et al., 2020).  The SSN is regionally based, 
with local authorities responsible for the organization and delivery of 
health services. The Lombardy region, the region hardest hit from the 
virus, has a capacity of 724 intensive care beds at its standard operational 
level (Armocida et al., 2020). Given the extensive need for intensive care 
help, that number was far too little. The National Health Service had to 
innovate. To tackle the medical equipment shortage, Italian Civil Protection 
undertook a ‚fast-track public procurement to secure 3,800 respiratory 
ventilators, an additional 30 million protective masks, and 67,000 
coronavirus tests‛ (Emergenza, 2020). On March 8th, 845 million euros were 
allocated for additional medical devices in equipment (Ministerodella 
Salute, 2020).There was also a shortage of health workers due to the 
decades of inadequate recruitment practices. Italy’s Ministry of Health put 
in place measures to recruit additional doctors and nurses to increase the 
capacity of intensive care units (Boccia et al., 2020), but, at this point, it was 
too late. Unfortunately, these measures have been implemented against a 
‚backdrop of the loss of many health care workers who have been 
quarantined or fallen ill with the infection, some of whom, tragically, have 
died‛ (Boccia et al., 2020). According to a study by Benedetta Armocida et 
al., there are a few lessons to be learned from the Italy’s failing government 
healthcare system and the COVID-19 crisis:  
‚<.health care systems capacity and financing need to be more 
flexible to take into account exceptional emergencies<in response to 
emergencies, solid partnerships between the private and public sector 
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should be institutionalized. Finally, recruitment of human resources 
must be planned and financed with long-term vision. Consistent 
management choices and a strong political commitment are needed to 
create a more sustainable system for the long run‛ (Armocida 2020).  
The Italian government did not have this long-term vision in mind when 
planning for the virus. They took small, partial steps along the way and 
hoped for the best.  
The presence of big government leads to failing government institutions 
as Italy is plagued by poor statistical infrastructures. Italy has suffered from 
two data-related problems, namely data scarcity and data precision, 
depending on the timeline. Many suggest that the unnoticed spread of the 
virus in early 2020 may have been due to the ‚lack of epidemiological 
capabilities and the inability to systematically record anomalous infection 
peaks in some hospitals‛ (Pisano et al., 2020). Recently, although the Italian 
government shows regularly updated statistics on its publicly available 
website, many have noticed a ‚striking discrepancy in mortality rates 
between Italy and other countries within Italian regions may (at least in 
part) be driven by different testing approaches‛ (Pisano et al., 2020). In the 
absence of comparable data, it is hard to make policy decisions. On various 
accounts, the Italian government was not prepared to fight a virus of this 
magnitude. Due to an already failing health system, partial solutions, and a 
lack of data transparency, the coronavirus outbreak suffocated Italy, and 
the end is nowhere in sight. 
 
5. United States 
According to the Global Health Security Index, which ranks the United 
States 1st out of 195 countries overall for pandemic preparedness, the U.S. 
was the most prepared country to deal with the coronavirus outbreak 
(GHS, 2019). The U.S. federal government’s initial response to the novel 
coronavirus is a prime example of the failure of big government. At the 
onset of the virus, President Trump and his administration downplayed the 
coronavirus and the month of February was a missed opportunity to move 
quickly to combat the coronavirus. At the end of February, Trump claimed 
the United States had the virus under control. Although it is fairly easy to 
point fingers at who is to blame for the rapid spread of the coronavirus in 
the United States, it comes down to the failures of big government and 
enormous government intervention.  
At the beginning of the crisis, the United States suffered a ventilator 
shortage that it should have been prepared for. In mid-March, there were 
not nearly enough lifesaving ventilator machines and there was ‚no way to 
solve the problem‛ before the disease fully hit the country (Kliff et al., 
2020). Hospitals were desperate because they could not find any place to 
buy the ventilators to help patients breathe while facing these respiratory 
defects that accompany the coronavirus. The United States was too ‚slow 
to develop a national strategy for accelerating the production of 
ventilators‛ (Kliff et al., 2020). The problem was not unique to the United 
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States. In China, Italy, France, and many other countries, there were just not 
enough to go around. The problem surrounding the ventilator was rooted 
in the global supply chain, which was disrupted by the coronavirus. Given 
the machine’s complicated makeups, many companies from all over the 
world are needed to produce a single ventilator. At that point, there was 
‚no simple way to substantially increase the output‛ (Kliff et al., 2020). 
Although the virus took a toll on the global supply chain, this ventilator 
shortage was no news to the United States, and the government failed to 
act quickly. Thirteen years ago, U.S. public health officials came up with 
plans to address what they thought was a crucial medical system 
vulnerability: ventilator shortages. The plan was to build a large fleet of 
inexpensive (around $3,000 each as opposed to $50,000) portable ventilators 
to then use in a flu pandemic. They reached the point where money was 
budgeted, a federal contract was signed, and work was beginning to start 
production. However, the plan was halted when a ‚multibillion-dollar 
maker of medical devices bought the small California company that had 
been hired to design the new machines‛ (Kulish et al., 2020). Zero 
ventilators were ultimately produced. Now, with the coronavirus ravaging 
America’s healthcare system, the country’s emergency-response stockpile 
was still waiting for its first shipment. The scarcity of ventilators became an 
emergency, forcing doctors to make life-or-death decisions about who gets 
to breathe and who does not‛ (Kulish et al., 2020). If the U.S. government 
was prepared and acted sooner, lives could have been saved as a result.  
Along with the American government’s inability to provide enough 
ventilators, the bureaucratic nature of federal institutions slowed the 
country’s response to the virus. The most notable failure in the United 
States had everything to do with the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s (CDC) testing kits and the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) ban of home testing. The CDC and FDA, two 
federal institutions, slowed America’s response to the coronavirus. The 
CDC’s initial coronavirus test, in an attempt to indulge in aggressive 
screening to help contain the virus, failed and resulted in a lost month in 
the fight against the virus. On February 5th, the CDC began to send out 
coronavirus testing kits, but due to contaminated reagents, the tests found 
faulty negative controls. When labs possessed failed negative controls, they 
had to ship their samples to the CDC itself for testing. Thus, between early 
February and early March, large-scale testing of possibly infected people 
did not occur due to technical flaws, ‚regulatory hurdles, business-as-usual 
bureaucracies, and lack of leadership on multiple levels‛ (Shear et al., 2020). 
The United States lost its best chance of containing the spread of the virus, 
and, at that point, Americans were blind to the extent of the global public 
health emergency (Alder, 2020). By mid-February, the United States was 
testing only about 100 samples per day, according to the CDC’s website. 
According to Dr. Thomas Frieden, former CDC Director, the ‚absence of 
robust screening until it was ‘far too late’ revealed failures across the 
government‛ (Shear et al., 2020). Given the limited testing capacity, the 
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CDC’s criteria for who was able to be tested remained extremely slim for 
the following weeks to come: ‚only people who had recently traveled to 
China or had been in contact with someone who had the virus‛ (Shear et al., 
2020). The lack of tests in the states also meant that local public health 
officials could not conduct surveillance testing. According to Jennifer 
Nuzzo, an epidemiologist at Johns Hopkins, if we ‚had done more testing 
from the very beginning and caught cases earlier<we would be in a far 
different place’‛ (Shear et al., 2020). 
The CDC’s faulty tests were not the only form of U.S. government 
barriers to testing asthe FDA was a major roadblock in combatting the 
coronavirus in America. As soon as Alex Azar, the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, declared a public health emergency on February 4th, new 
FDA regulations were set in place. From that point on, ‚any lab that 
wanted to conduct its own tests for the new coronavirus would first need 
to secure something called an Emergency Use Authorization from the 
FDA‛ (Baird, 2020). The FDA did not allow outside labs to create their own 
tests until the end of February, so the United States fell behind in the fight 
against the virus. The U.S. government, through red tape and regulation, 
lost precious time in containing the outbreak for its country and ultimately 
led its nation to be the most affected country in the world (COVID-19 MAP, 
2020). 
The CDC and FDA’s typical bureaucratic structure got in the way of 
America’s rapid response time. These institutions are typical federal 
bureaucracies: there is no independence from the president or Congress. 
Since their budgets and funding come straight out of Congress, the CDC 
and the FDA have a strong incentive to give Congress what it want. The 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce has oversight of the FDA, and 
their job is to legislate on drug safety. The FDA acts appropriately but 
along with their regulations come other unnecessary protocols and 
procedures that are harmful to society. The FDA acts ‚not just with long 
and costly drug approval processes, but with bans on N95 mask cleaning 
and rules banning hospitals from using foreign made KN95 masks that are 
essentially the same as N95s‛ (Jones, 2020). Garett Jones, Senior Research 
Fellow at the Mercatus Center, examines the comparison between the 
CDC/FDA responses with that of the Federal Reserve, an independent 
institution. By just mid-April, the Federal Reserve’s assets have grown by 
about 50%, all without congressional hearings and without Executive 
Office interference. The Fed’s power of independence – to ‚buy municipal 
and corporate bonds, to create swap lines with other central banks, to buy 
mortgage bonds, to search for ways to create direct lending programs that 
bypass banks and get to small and medium-size businesses— has so far 
been one of the most successful government responses to the COVID-19 
crisis‛ (Jones, 2020). The CDC and FDA could have that same 
independence and can act more successfully if it created a greater distance 
from politicians that just slow down their processes. Independence works. 
Ample evidence shows that countries that have independent central banks 
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have lower inflation and fewer financial crises. Good governance at the 
CDC and FDA require longer-term planning, but ‚full democracy is a 
barrier to good health policy just as it is a barrier to good monetary policy‛ 
(Jones, 2020).  
Given the U.S. government’s failure in mitigating the coronavirus crisis, 
the United States is the hardest hit country today. According to the Johns 
Hopkins Coronavirus Map on October 18th, the United States 
reports8,127,522 confirmed cases and219,534 (COVID-19 MAP, 2020). In 
order to get back up on its feet, the United States must make rapid 
screening tests widely available. The U.S. must ‚fast-track approval and 
production of cheap paper-strip antigen tests that would alert the newly 
infected of the need to isolate‛ (Stock, 2020) rather than allow bloated 
bureaucracy to slow down testing processes. The coronavirus in the United 
States simply represented ‚one of the greatest nonviolent power grabs in 
U.S. history, pushing the lockdowns well beyond the initial three-week 
prediction, thereby taking control of 330 million lives‛ (Harrigan et al., 
2020). American politicians never seemed to realize that ‚sometimes doing 
less, or even doing nothing, is by far the better approach‛ (Harrigan et al., 
2020). With a decrease in regulation and government intervention, the 
United States could have been in a far better place.  
 
6. Sweden 
Sweden’s laissez-faire approach helped the country avoid dangerous 
government failures. Since the start of the pandemic, Sweden was an 
outlier as the country took a different approach; it never went into 
lockdown. Businesses, gyms, and restaurants were not ordered to shut 
down and its day care centers and schools mostly stayed open, regardless 
of the ban on gatherings of 50 or more people (Swedish Approach, 2020).  
Starting in May, deaths began to fall and continued to fall through the 
summer as Swedes started to gather in more crowded places like beaches 
and restaurants, mostly without masks. Although many critics had doubts 
and it is too early to make final consensuses, the ‚no-lockdown approach‛ 
seemed to work in Sweden’s favor. As coronavirus cases rise in the 
majority of European countries, they have been sinking all summer in 
Sweden. On a ‚per capita basis, they are now 90 per cent below their peak 
in late June and under Norway’s and Denmark’s for the first time in five 
months‛ (Milne, 2020).  
Sweden’s success lies in its ability to follow its constitution and protect 
individual liberty and freedom of movement. The Swedish response’s 
success lies in one of the most important parts of its constitution: Chapter 2, 
Article 8, otherwise known as the Regerings form. The section states: 
‚Everyone shall be protected in their relations with the public institutions 
against deprivations of personal liberty. All Swedish citizens shall also in 
other respects be guaranteed freedom of movement within the Realm and 
freedom to depart the Realm‛ (Instrument of Government, 2019). On that 
note, the Swedish Constitution rests on robust independence of public 
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authorities from government interference. Thus, bureaucracy 
entanglements are limited, and policy implementation runs smoothly.   
Sweden’s political institutions, therefore, are free from political 
meddling in its constitution, increasing the strength of its democracy. The 
Public Health Agency of Sweden is an important public body to highlight 
given its high degree of independence from the government. The Regerings 
form states that no public authority or ‚’decision-making body of any local 
authority may determine how an administrative authority shall decide in a 
particular case relating to the exercise of public authority vis-à-vis an 
individual or local authority, or relating to the application of the law’‛ 
(Jonung & Hanke, 2020). Therefore, the Public Health Agency of Sweden is 
operated by experts, not politicians. These experts have developed a 
broader approach than most epidemiologists, and the numbers speak for 
themselves.  As of October 13, 2020, Sweden has 0.11 daily new confirmed 
COVID-19 deaths (rolling 7-day average) per million people and this figure 
has been steadily declining since peaking in mid-April (Coronavirus 
Pandemic Explorer, 2020). Sweden only has 100,654 confirmed cases of 
coronavirus and 5,899 deaths, which is relatively small compared to its 
European neighbors (COVID-19 MAP, 2020). From the onset of the crisis, 
Swedish economists knew the enormous economic costs a lockdown would 
pose to its society and made sure Swedish epidemiologists and the public 
were aware of the risks. Thus, Sweden’s remarkable response to the 
coronavirus rests on its written constitution, the protection of individual 
liberties, and public trust in the country’s public officials. With its laissez-
faire approach, Sweden avoided the government failures experienced in 
China, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States that will remain in 
the post-pandemic future. Sweden’s coronavirus response should serve as a 
model for countries who continue to struggle in combatting the virus. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The coronavirus crisis exposed some of the most significant government 
failures in recent history, including the failure to act swiftly and efficiently 
and bloated bureaucracy getting in the way of smooth policy responses. 
Politicians and bureaucrats acted in a way that would benefit them, in turn 
squeezing individual liberties and citizens’ right to know what was 
occurring in their country. Government cannot be counted on to correct 
market and political failures. The Chinese failed by covering up the extent 
of the virus and holding this information hostage from its people and the 
rest of the world, causing the outbreak to spiral completely out of control. It 
pioneered an information war that not only led leaders to craft their own 
narrative as to how they were handling the virus, but repressed freedom of 
speech in ways that exceeded expectations and do not seem as if they will 
disappear anytime soon. The United Kingdom not only undermined the 
virus but had a weak government-run healthcare system that was ill-
equipped to handle the capacity it was meant to serve. In Italy, leaders did 
not act swiftly, and the complex bureaucratic system entangled itself in the 
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nation’s response, causing it to be one of the hardest hit countries from the 
pandemic. In the United States, federal agencies lost precious time needed 
to get ahead of the curve by preparing beforehand and instead had failing 
tests and strict regulation on testing which harmed the speed at which the 
virus was tracked in the nation. An effective approach towards combatting 
the virus requires a war-like mobilization in terms of resources, efficiency, 
and coordination. Rather than following unnecessary laws that are 
preventing health professionals from rapidly responding to the pandemic, 
policymakers must approach further crises with facts and figures, 
following success stories and learning from failures. By protecting 
individual liberties and freedom of movement, Sweden was able to ‚flatten 
the curve‛ with its laissez-faire approach. The Cato Institute summarizes 
the proper role of government in a pandemic: 
‚Humility counsels policymakers not to assume in every case that 
they can better assess the benefits and costs of shutdowns or 
lockdowns than private citizens, nor that federal policymakers can do 
so better than states or localities. To ensure containment efforts are 
proportionate and do minimal damage to the American people, 
policymakers must base them on solid epidemiological information 
and commit to lifting them upon reaching prespecified targets‛ 
(Proper Role, 2020). 
The need for immediate action is crucial in containing the spread of the 
virus, and in the cases of China, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S., these nations 
lost precious time that lead each country into their own death spiral. 
The coronavirus crisis in these four nations proved that big government 
intervention caused more harm than good. The same lesson could be 
applied to other countries who are struggling to combat their outbreaks. 
Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis must lead to some set of institutional 
reforms so that countries can be better equipped to respond to future public 
health risks. As Chris Edwards succinctly stated it in his 2015 study on why 
government fails: ‚political and bureaucratic incentives and the huge size 
of the federal government are causing endemic failure‛ (Edwards, 2015). 
The more government tries to intervene in hopes of providing a better life 
for its citizens, lower qualities of life will consequently ensue. The first step 
to a more efficient and prosperous life for all is reducing the size of 
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